ABSTRACT

At first glance, there could not have been a better time to carry out a military reform than in 1992. The turmoil that followed the fall of the Soviet Union complicated matters, but also created a unique opportunity for Russia to start reforms. Although Yeltsin’s popularity within the Armed Forces petered out quickly – not least as a result of the role he played in the implosion of the Soviet Union – his popular mandate was strong after his decisive role in suppressing the August Coup in 1991.1 There was a surge of support for democracy in the country while the Armed Forces, like many other institutions, were at a loss, trying desperately to adapt to the new situation. Most importantly, there were no significant large-scale external threats to Russia.2

At the same time, several of the newly independent neighbouring republics grew increasingly unstable after the fall of the Soviet Union. Although this did not result in a direct external threat to Russian territory, it did involve new challenges for the Russian military organization as it took on tasks in the former Soviet republics. For the time being, however, Russia enjoyed a period of relative international calm and a benign environment. The conditions for planning and implementing a thoroughly thought-through military reform were thus quite favourable. In spite of this, military reform came to a standstill almost at once.