ABSTRACT

The political development in the Soviet Union and Russia from the late 1980s and onwards has been nothing short of breathtaking. An empire crumbled and fell, bringing fifteen independent states into existence. Russia in particular went from being the centre of an authoritarian, socialist Soviet Union to building a new Russian state and introducing democracy and a market economy. All these changes could not but lead to momentous changes within the Russian military establishment. The Russian military found itself within an entirely new strategic environment. For example, the country had fourteen new neighbouring states and had lost most of its military allies that were tied to the Soviet Union through the Warsaw Pact. Meanwhile, innovations in the field of military technology and warfare had long pointed to the need for military reform. This was brought home to the Russian military not least after the Gulf War in 1991. Relations between the military and society underwent change as well. The

Soviet military officer had been a respected member of an elite that enjoyed much sought-after privileges. He was the outpost against aggressive Western imperialism and warmongering. The heavy burden that the Soviet military imposed on society was seldom, if ever, questioned. This state of affairs changed drastically with the fall of the Soviet Union. Starting under Gorbachev and accelerating in the 1990s, there was less consensus on the need to prioritize military spending in the way it had been prioritized throughout most of the Soviet era. The West was no longer the enemy it had been. Instead, the lifestyle of the West was increasingly seen as something to aspire to. Living a good life, zhit normalno, became the main concern of most Russians at the same time as the prestige and authority once enjoyed by the Russian military rapidly eroded. Russian military personnel were left with a feeling of having been bitterly abandoned and let down by an ungrateful society and political leadership. It was thus hardly surprising that the changes that Russian society underwent, starting in the late 1980s, would lead to tensions between the military and civilian sectors of society. The challenges that resulted from these changes would have to be met by

the political leadership. It would have to provide a new list of threats that the

Russian military was to prepare to meet. No less important, the political leadership had to decide in no uncertain terms which threats were no longer relevant. Moreover, the Kremlin had to provide the guidelines for how to meet these threats, and this involved difficult questions such as which force posture Russia should have, which threats were to be handled by the military as opposed to the police, what would be the role of the strategic nuclear forces compared to conventional forces, and so on. In other words, military knowhow was of the essence if political circles were to be able to decide these questions. Finally, the political leadership needed to hammer out a new place for the military organization within a rapidly changing Russian society. This was by no means an easy task, but was essential if questions of manning and financing were to be resolved in the long term.