The East Asian International Society

This chapter explores the constitutional structures of the East Asian International Society, and how they informed both China and Japan’s identities and interests, as well as their bilateral relations. The ‘international environment’ under investigation here has been termed the ‘East Asian International Society’. Constitutional structures of an International Society are, Reus-Smit suggests, made up of three normative beliefs, namely the ‘moral purpose of the state’, the ‘organizing principle of sovereignty’, and the ‘norm of procedural justice’. These norms are important in that they decide ‘what constitutes a legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they define the basic parameters of rightful state action’, thus playing a crucial part in the shaping of the fundamental institutions of societies of states.1 Reus-Smit argues that of these three normative elements, the ‘moral purpose of the state’ – the reasons for forming some form of political association (here, the state) to serve a common good – plays a crucial role in ‘providing the justificatory foundations for the principle of sovereignty and the prevailing norm of pure procedural justice’.2 In the case of the modern society of states we see today, the legitimate state was expected to provide ‘the institutional climate necessary for human flowering’, based on popular consent.3 This spawned the belief that a state’s sovereignty with regard to its internal affairs was, provided it enjoyed popular legitimacy, to be respected. The organizing principle of liberal sovereignty was thus born. Accordingly, institutions such as international law and multilateralism were devised to further the implementation of these principles, giving rise to the norm of procedural justice based on legislation. As we will see below, the ‘moral purpose of the state’ within the East

Asian International Society was derived from Confucianism, and aimed for ‘the support and maintenance of the moral, social, and cultural order of social peace and harmony’.4 Accordingly, the fundamental interests of states within the order became those of enhancing and demonstrating the ability to maintain the appropriate social hierarchies that would promote cosmic harmony. In the Confucian order, those who stood at the apex of the order were

charged with the role of maintaining the social hierarchy, a prerogative of the virtuous that carried substantial prestige. Member states of the Society thus competed to place themselves in the highest social position possible. This was also reflected in the hierarchical ‘organizing principle of sovereignty’ of the order. Of course, any term based on geographic location can be problematic, as

the boundaries of any area are often unclear and open to varying interpretations. It is therefore worth briefly explaining the meaning of ‘East Asia’ here. The term is meant to imply a normative boundary, rather than a geographic one. It includes China, Japan, Korea, the Ryu-kyu-Kingdom and Vietnam (although Vietnam did not play a significant role in Sino-Japanese bilateral relations under the East Asian International Society, and is not subject to detailed analysis). All of these states had a long history of cultural borrowing from China and had, to different degrees, internalized Confucian ideology. They also shared a ‘common image of the world’ derived from Sinocentrism,5 which formed the basis for the social structures of the Society, far more than any of China’s other neighbours. It is for this reason that the East Asian International Society has often

been known as the ‘Chinese world order’,6 and there is certainly some justification for use of this particular term. The constitutive norms of the East Asian International Society were hegemonic constructs that originated from China, and were premised on Confucianism and the assumption of Chinese supremacy. Many states that wished to have diplomatic relations with China often had little choice but to accept them. However, the term ‘Chinese world order’ also gives the impression of a monolithic order in which China’s preeminence was never in doubt. As will become clear in the discussions below, this was hardly the case; much more contestation took place within this order than the term ‘Chinese world order’ implies. The Chinese were frequently forced to interact with their neighbours on equal terms, and some neighbours even engaged in acts that would usurp China’s position at the apex of the East Asian International Society. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that these states never challenged the constitutive norms of the order, indicating that they had to a certain extent internalized the normative stipulations of the Sinocentric international order. The term ‘Chinese world order’, however, does little justice to this complexity. The chapter is broadly divided into three sections. First, it begins by sur-

veying the East Asian International Society. The emphasis is on how the order was supposed to function in theory, and necessarily takes a somewhat Sinocentric view which represents the ‘ideal type’ of the order. As the Society did not collapse until the expansion of European International Society, the chapter covers a long period of time; the arguments forwarded in this chapter are thus of a general nature. Although the historical origins of the Society are contested,7 there appears to be some agreement that it reached its apogee around the time of the Ming (明1368-1644) and Qing (清1644-1911) dynasties,8 and this forms the historical backdrop of discussions throughout

this chapter. The chapter analyses the constitutional structures of the East Asian International Society and proceeds to explore how these social structures shaped its members’ identities and interests. Here, identity is defined in collective terms, and is understood to be formed through membership of an international order and interaction with its members. It is, in Alexander Wendt’s words, ‘sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object’.9 Members’ interests are derived from their international social environment, and are shared collectively throughout members of the order. If the first section looks at how the East Asian International Society was supposed to operate in theory, the second section looks at how the Society functioned in practice. Here, we turn away from Sinocentrism and survey how the constitutional structures informed the behaviour of non-Chinese member states. The final section examines the specific, and discusses how Sino-Japanese interactions took place under this order.