ABSTRACT
One of the few established near-facts in comparative politics research is that democracies tend to be relatively economically developed. There are exceptions to this tendency – the most significant being India – but in general, the relationship between economic development and democracy is very strong (Lipset 1959; Cutright 1963; Huntington 1991; Diamond 1992; Londregan and Poole 1996; Przeworski et al. 1996; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Geddes 1999; Boix and Stokes 2003). Although exceptions like India may lead us to the conclusion that high levels of economic development are not necessary for consolidating democracy, given the cross-national strength of this relationship, we must ask the question of whether varying levels of economic development have played an important role in the differing democratic outcomes across our three case studies. This chapter begins with an overview of the theoretical propositions thought to explain this particular relationship – that is, why are democracy and economic development so consistently related to one another? – and then turns to an analysis of economic development in Italy, Spain, and Turkey.
