ABSTRACT
In analysing why the transitions to democracy have not yielded the expected
results, a common claim is that a society’s propensity or ‘fitness’ for democ-
racy is predicated on its cultural and geographic proximity to the West
(Nodia 2002a, b; McFaul 2002). In this chapter, I begin by discussing the
culture concept and how culture has been used as an explanation to explain
the lack of democratization. I then ask, ‘What is considered to be Armenian
culture’? and, in doing so, I focus on those cultural narratives that are seen
as affecting democracy building. I then examine the attempts by Western donors and democracy promoters to ‘manage’ culture through capacity
building and training of trainer exercises in order to affect the cultural atti-
tudes and behaviours that they believe are obstacles to democratization.
While I would argue that cultural beliefs and ideologies are certainly
important and do affect individuals’ understanding, behaviours and accep-
tance or rejection of particular ideas and paradigms, I am sceptical of the
essentializing discourses which view culture as an essential, monolithic and
static entity. Furthermore, I find the tendency in some of the ‘transitological’1
works that describe culture as a mitigating factor to democratization to
speak of the ‘other’ as being affected by culture, while claiming to be objec-
tive or simply ignoring how one’s own behaviours and understanding are
also influenced by cultural beliefs, quite problematic. I suggest taking a more
flexible and dynamic view of culture which also considers the impact of the
culture of Western policy makers and foreign experts engaged in democracy
building. Otherwise, there is an implicit assumption that those transmitting
the ideas or conducting the trainings are objective and neutral, while the recipients of those ideas and training are beholden to and constrained by
their cultures.