ABSTRACT
Three climates of contrarian discourse have thrived in post-revolutionary Iran. By far the most noticed and privileged among these is the cognitive discourse articulated by intellectuals. Meanwhile, the expressive discourse of the peer-group networks, and the traditionalist discourse developed by heterodox charismatic movements remain obscure to most observers. Cognitive discourses of dissent articulated by intellectuals mould the ‘public opinion’ and pave the path of organized collective action and social change. They embody deliberate and conscious resistance of what Robert Ezra Park called ‘the public’. Expressive and traditionalist discourses of dissent, on the other hand, reflect the temperament of Park’s ‘crowd’. Far from sober responses to oppression, they signify improvised and chaotic but tremendously effective reactions to repression. Their sparse articulation, their episodic resurgence (during football celebrations, sectarian revolts, and other occasions for spontaneous collective action), their dependence on visual and emotional means of expression, and their evanescence make them even more elusive and invisible to the investigative gaze. Nevertheless, as expressive and traditionalist discourses of discontent embody the needs and aspirations of vast segments of the population, they are indispensable to an adequate understanding of political culture in contemporary Iran. They contain energies that can, in time, fuel full-fledged dissident movements.1 We must not forget that the Revolution itself started not as a rational extension of the cognitive revolutionary discourse analyzable in purely political, organizational, cultural, economic, or military terms but as largely spontaneous collective action that proved unpredictable not only to Western analysts but even to its own leaders and participants. The Iranian Revolution, thus, sprang forth and gathered force in opposition to seemingly minor provocations, harvesting tremendous energy out of every measure taken for its suppression. Only after the Revolution had already started was the cognitive component made salient, causing the articulation of demands and selection of heroes and leaders.2 None of this is intended to belittle the role of cognitive discourse, which has been and continues to be central to opposition politics in Iran. Hence, we will start this study with a brief taxonomy of cognitive discourses of the opposition in contemporary Iran before moving on to the expressive and traditionalist discourses.
