ABSTRACT
In contrast, Hasan Isma>il al-Hudaybi, who succeeded al-Banna’ as Murshid , is a much more controversial fi gure. There are some brothers who put forward rather negative views on his period as leader. Al-Hudaybi’s policies in the early 1950s were described as disastrous for the future of the Brotherhood; he was accused of weakness, of failing to unify the organisation in its opposition to the political system and of letting down the Brotherhood in its efforts to contain >Abd al-Nasir’s despotic exertions. Others depict al-Hudaybi’s style of taking charge of the Brotherhood as autocratic, not permitting the building of democratic structures. 2 These and other comments about al-Hudaybi’s ability resulted in downplaying of his contribution to the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, since the late 1990s one can trace instances of reconciling al-Hudaybi’s reputation as one of the most important leaders of the fi rst generation. In the same vein, there is a growing recognition that he and his vision of the organisation paved the way for the ideological profi le of today’s Society of the Muslim Brotherhood. 3 This can be seen in the fact that offi - cial statements of the Muslim Brotherhood clearly emphasise non-violence, with an occasional reference to Du<at la Qudat (Preachers not Judges). 4 Additional evidence for al-Hudaybi’s legacy is the fact that successive leaders, such as >Umar al-Tilmisani, Mustafa al-Mashhur and his son Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, were trusted companions of al-Hudaybi during his prison years. 5 The infl uence of al-Hudaybi on the subsequent leadership can be measured by the fact that the current Murshid , Muhammad Mahdi Akif, also refers to Hasan al-Hudaybi as a major infl uence on his thinking. 6 Similarly, the now General Secretary Mahmoud Ezzat said that Hasan al-Hudaybi encouraged his followers to read Qutb, but that the Brotherhood ‘should follow the rules mentioned in the research “Preachers not Judges”’. 7
The success of the founder, al-Banna’, seems to be so pertinent that it was the measure by which his successor Hasan al-Hudaybi was assessed. Not only for this reason is it necessary to engage, albeit briefl y, with Hasan al-Banna’s legacy. However, it is not the intention here to present a comprehensive history of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood under al-Banna’, since the topic is beyond the scope of this book and because it has already been done elsewhere in greater detail. What is left to be done here is to focus on the historical circumstances of the late 1940s and to ask what impact this context had on the leadership of al-Banna’s successor. Considering that the government issued an order of dissolution in December 1948 and that al-Banna’ was murdered, it is fair to ask whether the latter’s policies were indeed successful. To put it bluntly: did al-Banna’, despite his success in building up the Brotherhood and its signifi cance as a political mass movement, fail in the end? Was he really the ultimate example of a leader, or was he the root of a crisis which befell the Brotherhood by 1949? Were political circumstances such that the organisation was made a scapegoat for the failures of an ill-functioning political system? Was the Brotherhood becoming too powerful, too much a competitor for power? Or was the Brotherhood an organisational giant which lacked internal command and structure? These and other questions set the tone for the Brotherhood’s prospects after al-Banna’.
