ABSTRACT
Regional cooperation in South Asia is an intergovernmental process, where political leaders engage in bargaining and negotiation to promote their respective state’s multiples national interests. Growth of regional cooperation, thus, depends on the willingness of the political leaders to pursue regional cooperation policies. The political leaders’ willingness depends greatly on the payoff of regional cooperation to political leaders. The most valuable payoff for the political leaders is to retain political power. In order to retain political power, political leaders need adequate domestic support for their policies. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the power-retaining motivation of political actors will force them to anticipate the reactions of key societal groups on specific regional cooperation policies and avoid those policies that will bring them into confrontation with dominant domestic groups. Thus, lack of adequate domestic support or negative reactions for regional cooperation policies can contribute to a dampening of enthusiasm among the ruling coalitions to seek deep levels of regional cooperation. In contrast, adequate domestic support or positive reactions from domestic groups toward a specific regional cooperation policy can create a more favorable environment for policymakers to pursue cooperation policies. Given this dynamic, the present chapter examines the nature of domestic support for regional cooperation in South Asia.
