ABSTRACT
Bin Ali came to power in a bloodless coup in November 1987, ousting his
predecessor, the octogenarian Habib Bourguiba, who had ruled Tunisia
since the end of the French protectorate in 1956 (Moore, 1988). Bin Ali set two goals for his rule: democratization and national reconciliation (Her-
massi, 1995, p. 109). This chapter addresses directly the issue of Tunisia’s
democratization. Tunisia largely meets with Western approval for being a
post of moderation, stability, and liberal politics (Waltz, 1991, p. 29). But to
an extent, there is a myth about the country’s ‘‘liberal politics.’’ Under the
patrimonial Bourguiba’s patrimonial regime (Krichen, 1992, pp. 32-41)
single party rule was the order of the day (Moore, 1965). The North
African country has an ‘‘electoral’’ democracy under his successor. But the resulting electoral regime that has been carefully controlled by the state is
largely constrictive, uncompetitive, and illiberal (Murphy, 1999; Harik,
1992; Zartman, 1991). The ‘‘routinization’’ and consolidation of Bin Ali’s
hold on power has, however, generated greater stability than was the case
with Bourguiba’s last years at the helm (Ware, 1986, pp. 30-5). That stabi-
lity has come at the expense of political pluralism, as will be elaborated
below. But it is in the area of economic management that Tunisia seems to
have established credibility (King, 1998, pp. 107-8; Economic Intelligence Unit, 1999). Economic liberalization, however, has gained more momentum
than political liberalization or the implications of economic liberalization,
for democratization remains uncertain (Murphy, 1997; Hermassi, 1994, pp.
227-42). In this vein, the extent to which economic development supports
uniformity will be explored.
