ABSTRACT
The chief advocate for removing animals from medical research laboratories considers that the inability, so far as we know it, of animals to consent to be so used for the benefit of humans is not sufficient to facilitate an ethical distinction between animals and humans as there are some human beings also who are incapable of voluntary participation in research. He refers to some human beings who are too young, too old, too enfeebled or too confused to give or withhold informed consent.1 He is correct in this assertion. However, it does not follow that animals should therefore be excluded from research. We have questioned both that the status of personhood consists in the possession of a variety of capacities and, relatedly, that differences in capacities are what ethically mark out human beings from other animals. The lack of capacity to consent does not automatically bar human beings from being participants in medical research. However, there are greater protections provided for them than there are for animals in research. These protections are based upon the regard we have for autonomy in human life where decisions either to treat or to carry out research on persons incapable of consent call for an approximation to an informed consent.
