ABSTRACT
In Chapter 1 we noted two unacceptable views of moral judgements which contend, on the one hand, that because they do not correspond with the character of empirical judgements then they are not subject to rational evaluation and are meaningless or, on the other hand, that as reasonableness is demanded of all judgements then ethical judgements must be like empirical judgements and, as a result, cannot be the subject of any disagreement which will defy resolution by rational people, given adequate information, time and patience. The two views are related insofar as they each assume a uniform view of factuality. A radical disagreement is one which cannot be resolved by an appeal to reason or evidence. The possibility of such disagreements in morality marks off moral discourse from standard empirical discourse. That is, while many moral disagreements might be resolved by appeal to reason and evidence neither of these sources can guarantee that reasonable people will agree.
