ABSTRACT
Privacy and autonomy have been linked in the way that privacy allows for an area of creative experimentation free from any urge to self-censor that arises as a result of potential publicity that exposes people to criticism from others. This chapter illustrates Kant and Mill's different conceptions of the relationship between autonomy and privacy. Both Kant and Mill explicitly associate privacy and autonomy with morality, enlightenment and social progress. The chapter discusses Nedelsky's arguement that autonomy, such as that described by Kant, is impossible to obtain. It then relates Battersby's position to that of Nedelsky on relational autonomy. The chapter also suggests how Spinoza provides a different concept of relational autonomy. Spinoza produces a framework in which it is possible to think about the boundaries between bodies differently. The chapter concludes by answering some questions posed by Julie Cohen who states that autonomy cannot be viewed as complete but that to talk about degrees of autonomy seems incoherent.
