ABSTRACT
As any work in the terrorism field, this book also cannot escape the issue of defining the phenomenon itself. It is not the ambition here to provide a universally acceptable definition of terrorism, which by itself constitutes a virtually impossible endeavor. Instead, the goal is to select a broad definition that will allow a wide inclusion of cases directly relevant to the topic under scrutiny, also reflecting the main source of data used in this study. For the purposes of this book, terrorism shall be defined as the use or threat of use of anxiety inducing, extranormal violence for political purposes by any individual or group, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims.3 This definition emphasizes several key elements. First, the definition excludes states as perpetrators (but not as sponsors) of terrorist violence. This is not to suggest that states do not engage in acts of terrorism, quite the contrary appears to be true. The main reason behind their non-inclusion, however, is to isolate the focus of the study to non-state actors, who seem to follow very different patterns of innovation than states. Second, the definition presented above purposefully leaves out the specifications of the target of terrorism, since if one considers only attacks against civilians, it is practically impossible to flesh out fully the scope of terrorist tactics used thus far. Such a definition would also inhibit the examination of a given terrorist group’s targeting progression from attacking armed forces to targeting noncombatants, which is an essential component of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Many organizations start off their campaign by attacking combatant targets, and progress to noncombatants only after their capability to attack combatants successfully is diminished, or after the group decides that an escalating strategy designed to target a wider population is needed. Including noncombatants as the exclusive target of terrorism would inhibit the study of a given terror group’s early operational patterns, rendering any analysis of tactical and/or technological progression incomplete. The final point to make in this regard is that the definition as it is presented above allows for a balanced examination of both tactical and technological innovation as the isolated element under inspection, without getting involved in the highly subjective debate regarding the morality of targeting innocents. Quite simply this book
avoids treating the issue of terrorism from a moral perspective for practical reasons. In other words, while the above-presented definition of terrorism is by no means perfect, it is designed merely to facilitate the study of terrorist innovation, and as such serves its purpose.
