ABSTRACT
The latest revision of the Greek Constitution of 1975 – enacted in 20011 – acknowledged the Drittwirkung of constitutional rights, as a constitutional principle,2 by stating that ‘[T]hese rights also apply to the relationship between individuals wherever appropriate’.3 This principle has been at the heart of renewed attention in Greek legal thinking concerning the relationship between the Constitution and private law. It is submitted that this principle provides the foundation for a ‘judicial model’ of application of constitutional rights in private law while also confirming the dialectic rather than conflicting relationship between the two areas. The following analysis approaches the adoption of such a model in the Greek legal order through three different lenses: (a) the controversy between direct and indirect Drittwirkung in the way it has initially been developed and understood by Greek legal theory; (b) the channels that the new constitutional principle creates for an exchange between the Constitution and private law, and between judge and legislator; and (c) the effect of the theoretical controversy on judicial practice and its own unique understanding of the issue.
