ABSTRACT
Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages placed the so-called “rule-following considerations” at the center of philosophical attention. Kripke does not purport to provide an accurate account of the primary texts, but to propound “Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke.”1 As regards its content, Kripke’s interpretation is characterized by two features. First, like many other commentators, he adopts a communitarian reading of Wittgenstein, according to which rule-following and language are inherently social; second, like Fogelin before him,2 he portrays Wittgenstein as constructing a skeptical paradox in the style of Hume. As regards Wittgenstein studies proper, Kripke’s book stimulated an unprecedented interest in his remarks on rule-following, leading, e.g., to McDowell’s communitarian yet nonskeptical reading.3 It also helped to rekindle interest in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, for instance through Crispin Wright.4 But it was vigorously attacked by more orthodox interpreters like Baker and Hacker.5
At the same time, Kripke’s book was the starting point for a debate about “Kripkenstein” on rule-following, a debate which is now conducted largely in blissful disregard of Wittgenstein’s own writings.6
