EPISTEMOLOGY

Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, has often been thought to be at the heart of the philosophical enterprise. In Plato, it is also taken to be central to the practice of education. Thus, it underpins the ‘teaching’ of the slaveboy by Socrates in the Meno (Plato 1970a) (see erotetics) and it is supposed to support the banishment of the artists from the ideal republic (Plato 1970b). Whilst the particular conception of the search for knowledge which occurs in Plato has long been neglected, his conception of the conditions necessary for ascribing knowledge to anyone have lasted until the present time. Thus, he presents a definition of knowledge that has three elements. For someone to know a statement X, say that ‘Socrates is bald’, (a) they have to believe X; (b) X has to be true; and (c) they have to have good reasons for believing X. This justified true belief account of ‘knowledge’ has been, and

remains, the usual starting point for investigations into the nature of knowledge (but see Ryle 1949), despite the fact that, since Plato, it has been realised that the third condition is extremely problematic (if you have to know that you have good reasons for a belief before you claim knowledge then it seems that the definition is question-begging). Most epistemologists, until the present day, in accepting some form

of this definition, have also accepted that the process of justification has to stop somewhere. That is that, whilst most beliefs have to be justified by other beliefs, there must be some basic, foundational beliefs which do not stand in need of justification. The great divide amongst philosophers, at least since the eighteenth century, has been with regard to the nature of these foundational beliefs, with rationalists, following Descartes and Leibniz, thinking that pure reason can provide such foundations, while empiricisits, following Locke and Hume, believe that it is only experience of the world that in some way can provide the foundational propositions. Modern epistemology, whilst continuing to tease out the problems with the third condition (see Everitt and Fisher 1996 with regard to Gettier problems) has taken a rather different turn, with the main battle being between those who want to deny that knowledge needs foundations and those, following Popper and Quine, who believe that it does. Whilst it would be unrealistic to believe that education would

follow the twists and turns of this debate – although it would be gratifying if it showed some awareness of it – it would also be surprising if it had no influence at all on such things as the curriculum. Thus, it seems likely that the high status accorded to Mathematics

and Science within schools is partly a function of the fact that most epistemologists believe that if knowledge is to be found anywhere, it is to be found within these domains. However, the other side of this belief does not seem to have registered in the same way. Since at least the eighteenth century the cognitive status of statements within morality, artistic criticism and religion has been seriously in question. This should mean that if such areas are taught in school there should at least be some consideration of their cognitive status, and therefore some consideration of the type of support that can be given to statements within these areas. Whilst there is some work on some of these areas within philosophy of education (see Best 1992), it is not at all clear that such work has penetrated our schools (see knowledge). Of late, different challenges have been raised against the epistemo-

logical enterprise. Philosophers influenced by postmodernist thought such as Rorty (1980, 1991) have questioned the very possibility of giving an account of knowledge which is universalistic and culture-free. Instead, they propose attention to the different accounts of knowledge found in different cultural contexts (see relativism). However, such a relativisation of knowledge is not widely accepted – although it seems more widely accepted in education than it is within epistemology, and it has been cogently argued by philosophers such as Siegel (1997b) that this approach assumes exactly the type of assumptions that it seeks to deny.

Traditionally, arguments about equality have been closely concerned with questions about justice. Since education must be closely concerned with justice, the relationship between education and equality is important; however, since ‘equality’ means so very many different things, it is not easy to establish such a relationship. It is helpful to start with an account of the key distinctions. Equality as procedural justice. In this sense, equality is the requirement

that members of the same reference group receive the same consideration in relation to the allocation of scarce goods or desirable outcomes. Thus, all accused are entitled to a fair trial, all citizens in a democracy to a vote, students to proper assessment. This does not entail that they should all receive the same treatment. For example, procedural justice requires that all candidates for an examination receive fair assessment, it does not require that a candidate present himself in an examination hall even when he is bedridden. Procedural justice does not answer the question as to what the relevant reference

groups should be (for example, who is to count as a citizen). This question is one of social justice, that is, which groups should be treated equally? Equality of treatment entails that all in the same reference group are

treated in the same way. For example, all children follow the same syllabus and are taught together, irrespective of ability or motivation. Equality of treatment is often associated with comprehensive education and mixed-ability teaching, as well as with an absence of segregation on any grounds, including sex, race and disability. The aims of promoting equality of treatment in education are not always clear, since it does not seem to be a strict requirement of fairness (see above), but many proponents would see it as a means of promoting the esteem of relatively unfavoured groups as well as a potent means of promoting equality of outcome (see below). Equality of outcome entails that the end point of a process (like

education) is that all have the same allocation of desirable outcomes or scarce resources. For example, all receive the same exam grades or the same bursary. Although it is often thought that equality of treatment leads to equality of outcome, this is likely to hold only when individuals in the reference group are the same in all relevant respects such as ability, motivation and interest. Where they are different in one or more of these respects, as it is likely that they will be, then they will not all take the same advantage of the treatment provided. This will inevitably lead to inequalities of outcome. The egalitarian appears to be in a dilemma. On the one hand she wishes to provide the same treatment, thus provoking different outcomes; on the other, in insisting on equal outcomes she is compelled to differentiate treatments through policies such as affirmative action and specialist teaching. The assumption of human diversity is enough to generate this dilemma. Equality of opportunity. The usual liberal definition of this is as pro-

cedural justice, but it is common to hear more radical interpreters of the principle claim that, for it to be meaningful, resources must be equalised among individuals if there is to be a desirable outcome. So anyone accused of a criminal offence should receive the same quality of defence as anyone else accused, so as to equalise his chances of being found innocent. This claim has led some to maintain that equality of opportunity is not a coherent objective for an education system, since it is unrealistic to equalise resources relative to individuals (J. Wilson 1993). This might be a legitimate complaint against attempts to make equality of opportunity a form of equality of treatment, but not against the principle interpreted as a form of procedural justice; for all that the principle then entails is that no one is debarred from or discriminated against in seeking a desirable outcome such as

accreditation. Others, more radical still, maintain that inequality of outcome constitutes a ground for presuming that opportunities have been unequal. On this interpretation of the principle, equal outcomes should be engineered through the provision of unequal treatments. However, it also appears to violate the weaker, permissive, principle of equal opportunity since, in order to secure the same outcome, it may often be necessary to deny provision to some favoured groups or individuals. This means in effect that the weakest and strongest forms of equality of opportunity are in conflict with each other and that one has to choose between them even if one is satisfied on practical grounds that the achievement of either is possible. The conflict is then between fairness and sameness as ethical ideals. It might seem obvious that sameness cannot be such a powerful

ethical value as fairness. Indeed this is the type of criticism of egalitarianism made by J. P. White (1994). It would be fallacious to conclude that inequalities of treatment and outcome are not, therefore, of any ethical significance. It has been argued at least since the time that Plato wrote the Laws (1970c) that too much inequality damages society’s well-being and leads to resentment and social exclusion through the resulting unequal distribution of power and influence. Indeed, this insight has received substantial empirical backing through the work of, among others, Wilkinson (2005), who argues that large relative inequalities lead to increased morbidity and social disorder. Thus it is quite possible for someone who rejects strong egalitarian arguments to hold nevertheless that there need to be strict limits on inequalities of distribution. Such a position would be at odds with the theory of distributive justice found both in the neo-liberal position of Nozick (1974) and the more conservative liberalism of Rawls (1971, 1993). Educators have argued in favour of inequality on the grounds that

it promotes excellence, which is an intrinsic good (e.g. Cooper 1980). It has also been argued that diversity is desirable in order to accommodate the range of human abilities and interests (Entwistle 1970; C. Winch 1990). Against this it is maintained that inequality (or excessive inequality) in education leads to social disaffection and power differences that lead eventually to injustice. Questions of equality cannot, therefore, be a matter of complete indifference to educators.