ABSTRACT
In the first part of this book I argued that Oakeshott’s restatement of Idealist principles was a counter to the rise of empiricism in its then new form of logical positivism. Furthermore, I indicated how it was that positivism went down the road of linguistics. Although he was critical of their position, it may be said that Oakeshott was articulating a comparable point of view. In defending British Idealism Oakeshott turned it on its head. By taking ‘experience’ as the ‘Absolute’ and (unlike Bradley) fully ‘grounding’ his Monist philosophy so that nothing stood outside of experience, he turned attention to the modes of thought, the ‘traditions’ or ‘practices’ of human conduct. There is to be found in his work no transcendental principles, no ultimate reality, no experience beyond our comprehension, no historical finishing point, no metaphysical starting place save that of what is already known.
