ABSTRACT
One of the most unyielding problems of liberalism is how to define it. Theorists in the West do not usually engage in attempts to determine the content of liberalism, mainly because the theoretical debate has a sufficient semantic and topical stability. So arguments revolve around certain themes that rarely have crosscutting potential. Although, say, a profound disagreement on the essence of liberalism may lie at the heart of the debate on the concept of justice in a liberal political order, no one would seriously recast the debate as a confrontation between varying definitions of liberalism or liberty. That liberalism is conceptually underdetermined is demonstrated simply by looking at the various positions that liberals can adopt in different theoretical fields without ‘crossing swords’. Liberalism may be identified with such contrary positions as rationalism, and scepticism, and in fact it has even ‘found room for individualism and communitarianism’ (Gaus 2000: 193). The antinomic structure of liberalism may be of concern only to those who would like to construct a liberal theoretical edifice without any inherent tensions or contradictions. But while this may well turn out to be unrealistic on account of the various functions liberalism plays in modern society, from ideology and political doctrine to a coherent philosophy of ethics, Russian scholars have been particularly ‘vexed’ by the lack of a coherent definition of liberalism. The reasons for this seem clear. If there was a definition of liberalism that could command considerable theoretical support, what many Russians believe to be the pseudo-liberalism of the Gaidarian kind could be criticised and ‘unmasked’ as economically or politically motivated.
