ABSTRACT
Chapter 3 showed that biodiversity fails to be conserved because local and global externalities exist. At the global level, one way of thinking of this is that the rich countries of the North should pay the poorer countries of the South for the external benefits of their biodiversity. In the textbook world of Chapter 4, such payments would be some amount equal to or less than the ‘Willingness to Pay’ of the rich world for these benefits. It was also seen that some of these WTPs could be substantial, notably the value for carbon storage. This might be several times the value of land in the developing world for agricultural development. Once again, it is important to stress that the purpose of such ‘global bargains’ is not to take over the land from existing landowners. Rather it is to attenuate property rights so that land is used sustainably. Moreover, and critically important, such bargains can work to the mutual advantage of both sides. The developing country farmer, for example, could be better off with the trade than without it.
