ABSTRACT
Two realities define the United States (or US) situation since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001: unprecedented power and an infinity of vulnerabilities. America is the first nation in history that commands so much power, in so many different forms, that it can realistically consider the option of ruling the world. At the same time, Americans have become acutely aware of their susceptibility to attack from both traditional and non-traditional enemies. The challenge for Washington has been to fashion a new strategy which both builds upon America’s strengths and copes with its weaknesses in order to advance and protect US national interests. For over three years, that challenge has been taken up by a small coterie of individuals who, despite the fact that none of them were members of George W. Bush’s first cabinet, have exercised an extraordinary amount of influence on American foreign policy. Most commentators refer to this group as the neoconservatives, but other titles have been offered as well. Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler prefer the term ‘democratic imperialists’, while Charles Krauthammer (who contends that ‘…the use of the word “empire” in the American context is ridiculous’) opts for ‘democratic realists’ (Daalder and Destler 2003: 46, Krauthammer 2004). This chapter will attempt to analyse the goals and values of the contemporary neoconservative movement, but in accordance with American democratic traditions it will assume that America’s ‘hard-right turn’ in foreign policy is ultimately the responsibility of George W. Bush (Ikenberry 2004: 7). The almost complete domination of the Washington policy community by a few ideologically-driven individuals for a relatively long period of time is a rare
occurrence in modern American history. But these are not normal times. The question on the minds of many commentators and policy-makers is: have the neoconservatives already set the United States on a path that will be irreversible for many years to come?
