ABSTRACT
The Vietnamese decision of January 1959 to resume armed struggle as a means of reunification was made exclusively by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong. It was not a move initiated by either the Soviet Union or China, although the actions of the two were important parts of the Lao Dong’s decision to embark on a new and more militant strategy. In the years after the Geneva conference, both the Soviet Union and China failed to give Hanoi the necessary support to enable them to hold elections, and thereby reunification within the framework of the Geneva agreement. By the end of the 1950s there was, from a Vietnamese Communist perspective, only one other option left – reunification through armed struggle. Based on Soviet attitudes and behaviour in the preceding years – Moscow’s urge to promote détente and the peaceful transition to socialism – there was no reason at all for the Vietnamese to believe the Soviet Union would support them in, or even encourage, the launch of armed struggle to achieve reunification. Thus, from the early 1960s the Vietnamese Communists pursued the new strategy against the advice of Moscow, and initially also against the advice of Beijing.
