ABSTRACT
The prospect of addressing questions about the universality of basic ethical values seems both irresistibly important and impossibly daunting.2 The cluster of issues that comprise these questions are not only philosophically fundamental and central to so many areas of political theory, but also have a compelling practical urgency and relevance to thinking about the way in which we live. Yet, not only are the various competing arguments advanced in this area manifold and complex, but as so often in philosophy the questions themselves are sometimes obscure, and it can be difficult to grasp exactly what is at stake in answering them in one way rather than another. I want to begin, therefore, by making a few general points, before turning to the main enquiry. The purpose of these general remarks is to try to situate that enquiry in a broader context, as much as anything to make clear its limits, and what it does not attempt, rather than with the intention of saying anything deeply illuminating about the broader issues.
