ABSTRACT
Much has been written in recent years about moral absolutism and moral relativism, foundationalism and contextualism, monism and pluralism, universalism and particularism — all the ferventisms — and yet our understanding of these simple polarities does not seem to advance. Advocates of liberal enlightenment confront advocates of communal tradition; those who aspire to global reach confront those who yearn for local intensity. We all know one another’s lines. In every argument, we anticipate the opening gambits; we have memorized the standard replies and the follow-up moves; no one’s closing flourish is at all surprising. The different positions can be defended well or badly; it is still possible to win a debate, much as one might win a game of chess, with superior skill or the quickness to seize upon an opponent’s mistakes. But victories of this kind have no larger resonance. So I have looked for a way of being persuasive without trying to be victorious, a way of escaping the conventional oppositions or, at least, of redescribing them in less contentious terms. I want to argue from within what I, and many others, have taken to be the opposing camp; I want to take my stand among the universalists and suggest that there is another universalism, a non-standard variety, which encompasses and perhaps even helps to explain the appeal of moral particularism.
