ABSTRACT
In Part Two, Rorty turns from mind to knowledge: from the Mirror of Nature itself to the mirroring it is supposed to be capable of. This is the part of the book where Rorty makes his main case against philosophy, a case for which Part One paved the way, and of which Part Three will draw out the ramifications. It divides into four chapters. In Chapter 3, Rorty argues that Descartes’s invention of the mind, supplemented by two fundamental confusions – due to Locke and Kant respectively – paved the way to the invention of a new academic subject called ‘philosophy’. In Chapter 4, Rorty argues that crucial developments within twentieth-century philosophy – due to Quine and Sellars – have completely undermined the viability of that subject. And in Chapters 5 and 6, Rorty argues that attempts to revive the fortunes of philosophy – either as philosophy of psychology or as philosophy of language – are ill-advised and hence should be discontinued.
