ABSTRACT
Cold War politics, differing perceptions of the changing role of the UN in international affairs, in addition to the issue of Chinese representation in the UN, ultimately combined to prevent Japan’s admission in 1955. In considering the strategic positions of the US and USSR, this chapter demonstrates how Japan’s membership to the UN was a secondary factor in their considerations. Thus, for example, for the Dwight Eisenhower administration, the issue of Japan’s UN membership was a low priority in 1955 owing to America’s obsession with the realpolitik of the Cold War, particularly its strategic concern over the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In addition, the US government could not keep pace with the rapid shift towards the ‘universality’ of the UN, conspicuous among other small and middle-size countries. By contrast, the Soviet Union, with its new ‘peace offensive’ strategy took advantage of this opportunity, and fought hard for admission of Outer Mongolia and four other Soviet satellites. It also used the issue of Japanese admission to the UN as leverage in the faltering negotiations with Tokyo on USSR-Japan normalization.
