ABSTRACT
The theme of the individual is an important key in the understanding of Nishida Kitaro¯ and Tanabe Hajime’s philosophical theories. In fact, it exposes their intrinsically modern nature, which brings them to inquire the philosophical and/or religious dimensions of the individual. Politics becomes part of this picture in differentways. Some rudiments of political individualismcan be found inNishida, but with limited results. In particular, he develops individualism theoretically, without really being able to acquire a political dimension. On the contrary, a developed political philosophy was at the core of Tanabe’s thinking in the 1930s. However, although political in its articulation, Tanabe’s position resembles a religious way of salvation, in which the confrontation between individual and society is at the center of the philosopher’s concern. In this chapter, my aim is to summarize their fundamental thinking on this theme
and their attitudes toward individualism. I have chosen to start from the crucial period of their diatribe about the Logic of Place (basho no ronri), from 1927 on. This theoretical output by Nishida marks the beginning of a philosophical querelle with Tanabe about the relationship between the individual and the universal. Starting from this period, they both modify their thought in quite different directions. Therefore, it seems tome particularly suited to underline their different approaches to the theme in question. After briefly recalling the fundamental meaning of the Logic of Place, I will deepen the problem of the individual and individualism in their wartime philosophies. In the Logic of Place, Nishida finds in the search for the True Subject an impor-
tant source of philosophical inspiration. In fact, as stated in the work Hataraku mono kara miru mono e (From the Acting to the Seeing, 1924-27),1 it is in the name of the true face of individual things that he refuses theAristotelian and Kantian philosophies, reading them as representatives of respectively the irrational and the rational approaches to Reality. This interpretation leads him to radically reconsider the way of sublating things in the universals: as it is known, the philosopher builds a new logical-ontological theory, called ‘Logic of Place’, in which the universal, or Place, of Judgment – very similar to the Kantian notion of Transcendental Apperception, or ‘I-think’ – disappears in a Place of Absolute Nothingness
(zettai mu no basho), in order to let the things appear in their suchness (ari no mama).2 Nishida’s anti-subjectivist tendency to dismiss consciousness as a theoretical reference point brings him to define the True Subject as ‘the Predicate that cannot become Subject’, this Predicate being the extreme limit of universal: the Place (or universal) of Absolute Nothingness, being Nothingness, is actually identical with the True Individual Thing, disappearing in it. This approach to the problem, though an internal movement of consciousness, is already opened to the world of things. However, the Logic of Place is still belonging to the realm of interiority, of consciousness. This is exactly the aspect that leads Tosaka Jun to criticize Nishida’s Logic, accusing him of lacking dialectical character.3
