ABSTRACT

This chapter charts the antecedence and origins of the OECD, its evolution, and the organization’s triumphs and setbacks. In many respects, the OECD saga is about the organization and its members’ ongoing attempts to acclimatize to a world of their own making. Contiguous with other multilateral economic institutions, the OECD and its precursor, the OEEC, have constituted key nodes through which leading states hunted rules to advance globalization and govern the consequences. Strikingly, the concerns at the crux of the OECD have barely altered. The itinerary cited in the 2006 Ministerial Council Meeting (MCM) communiqué including “ensuring economic stability and improving economic performance,” “implementing economic reforms for growth and employment,” and a “programme to strengthen and modernize the multilateral (trading) system”1 is redolent of the founding convention and the first MCM communiqué of 1961. Similarly, the tools supporting the OECD’s mission have throughout been peer review, surveillance and soft law. The globalization of economic activity, however, engendered four

subtle changes to the OECD’s role and remit. First, the OECD went from an exclusively transatlantic club to boasting members from all but the African continent. Second, the OECD went from an organization that talked about non-members to one that talked to them.2 The unfettering of economic activity coupled the fortunes of OECD members to non-member states, especially the emerging economic superpowers of the global South. Despite expansion, only five contemporary OECD members hail from outside the transatlantic zone, forcing the OECD to incorporate more fully into its work those non-members averse or unready to assume membership. Third, the OECD expanded functionally. Lowering barriers to economic activity entailed a welter of issues that members illuminated through the OECD and it steadily accrued responsibilities in areas as diverse as corporate governance, the

environment, genetics, computer security and financial crime. In time, the OECD also moved from examining issues in isolation to considering how different domains interact and synchronize. The final change involved the genre of cooperative ventures pursued at the OECD. Lately, the OECD served less as a venue for countries to coordinate policies internationally and more as an institution where they strive to uncover appropriate domestic policies to meet their common objectives. The remainder of the chapter is partitioned into seven sections. The

following two sections consider the origins and record of the OEEC, and the factors compelling its evolution into the OECD. The chapter pays particular attention to the hegemonic influence of the United States in the conception and infant development of these institutions. Sections three through six depict the OECD’s performance under its first four secretaries-general. This periodization is partly one of convenience, a means of dividing nearly 50 years of history into manageable chunks, but also reflects the OECD Convention, which gives the secretary-general some latitude to influence the organization’s trajectory and status. The third section examines the early years of the OECD under Thorkil Kristensen (1961-69). Despite being hemmed in by other major international institutions the OECD made a sound debut in the core areas of finance, trade, and development. The fourth section reflects upon the reign of Emile van Lennep (1969-84) and the OECD’s consolidation amidst the aftershocks of the economic earthquakes of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of financial management in 1971 and the oil crisis in 1973. Although the OECD was a salve for the oil crises and negotiations to further liberalize trade, there were signs of disenchantment with the organization’s role and performance from amongst the membership. The fifth section describes how the OECD was overtaken by events under the leadership of JeanClaude Paye (1984-96). The OECD’s contribution to the completion of the Uruguay Round trade talks and panache for structural issues were overshadowed by the fundamental redrawing of the international system signified by the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Those viewing the OECD as a Cold War combatant wondered what role the OECD could possibly play in the “new world order”3 proclaimed by President George Bush, Snr. The sixth section deals with the attempts under Donald Johnston (1996-2006) to rescue the OECD from oblivion by reforming the institution. The seventh section acts a conclusion. It précis the main achievements of the OECD and briefly introduces the present secretary-general, Angel Gurria and some of the key challenges he faces if the reforms of the organization are to be completed successfully.