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Moral Responsibility
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Moral Responsibility

The Ways of Scepticism

Moral Responsibility

The Ways of Scepticism

ByCarlos Moya
Edition 1st Edition
First Published 2006
eBook Published 27 September 2006
Pub. location London
Imprint Routledge
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4324/9780203965603
Pages 256 pages
eBook ISBN 9781134194575
SubjectsHumanities
Get Citation

Get Citation

Moya, C. (2006). Moral Responsibility. London: Routledge, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203965603
ABOUT THIS BOOK

We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility.

Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility, and subjecting them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis, Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. A well-written and lively account, the book then goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at its root.

Offering an alternative to this scepticism, Carlos Moya shows how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility that stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |9 pages
Introduction: scepticism about moral responsibility (SMR)
View abstract
chapter 1|19 pages
Determinism and alternative possibilities: (SMR's premises A and B)
View abstract
chapter 2|58 pages
Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 3|43 pages
Moral responsibility and control: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 4|34 pages
Indeterminism and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise C)
View abstract
chapter 5|48 pages
Overcoming scepticism? Belief and moral responsibility
View abstract

We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility.

Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility, and subjecting them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis, Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. A well-written and lively account, the book then goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at its root.

Offering an alternative to this scepticism, Carlos Moya shows how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility that stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |9 pages
Introduction: scepticism about moral responsibility (SMR)
View abstract
chapter 1|19 pages
Determinism and alternative possibilities: (SMR's premises A and B)
View abstract
chapter 2|58 pages
Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 3|43 pages
Moral responsibility and control: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 4|34 pages
Indeterminism and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise C)
View abstract
chapter 5|48 pages
Overcoming scepticism? Belief and moral responsibility
View abstract
CONTENTS
ABOUT THIS BOOK

We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility.

Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility, and subjecting them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis, Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. A well-written and lively account, the book then goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at its root.

Offering an alternative to this scepticism, Carlos Moya shows how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility that stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |9 pages
Introduction: scepticism about moral responsibility (SMR)
View abstract
chapter 1|19 pages
Determinism and alternative possibilities: (SMR's premises A and B)
View abstract
chapter 2|58 pages
Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 3|43 pages
Moral responsibility and control: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 4|34 pages
Indeterminism and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise C)
View abstract
chapter 5|48 pages
Overcoming scepticism? Belief and moral responsibility
View abstract

We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility.

Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility, and subjecting them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis, Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. A well-written and lively account, the book then goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at its root.

Offering an alternative to this scepticism, Carlos Moya shows how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility that stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |9 pages
Introduction: scepticism about moral responsibility (SMR)
View abstract
chapter 1|19 pages
Determinism and alternative possibilities: (SMR's premises A and B)
View abstract
chapter 2|58 pages
Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 3|43 pages
Moral responsibility and control: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 4|34 pages
Indeterminism and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise C)
View abstract
chapter 5|48 pages
Overcoming scepticism? Belief and moral responsibility
View abstract
ABOUT THIS BOOK
ABOUT THIS BOOK

We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility.

Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility, and subjecting them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis, Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. A well-written and lively account, the book then goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at its root.

Offering an alternative to this scepticism, Carlos Moya shows how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility that stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |9 pages
Introduction: scepticism about moral responsibility (SMR)
View abstract
chapter 1|19 pages
Determinism and alternative possibilities: (SMR's premises A and B)
View abstract
chapter 2|58 pages
Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 3|43 pages
Moral responsibility and control: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 4|34 pages
Indeterminism and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise C)
View abstract
chapter 5|48 pages
Overcoming scepticism? Belief and moral responsibility
View abstract

We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility.

Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility, and subjecting them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis, Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. A well-written and lively account, the book then goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at its root.

Offering an alternative to this scepticism, Carlos Moya shows how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility that stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |9 pages
Introduction: scepticism about moral responsibility (SMR)
View abstract
chapter 1|19 pages
Determinism and alternative possibilities: (SMR's premises A and B)
View abstract
chapter 2|58 pages
Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 3|43 pages
Moral responsibility and control: (SMR's premise B)
View abstract
chapter 4|34 pages
Indeterminism and moral responsibility: (SMR's premise C)
View abstract
chapter 5|48 pages
Overcoming scepticism? Belief and moral responsibility
View abstract
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