ABSTRACT
The analysis of Chinese strategic behaviour at the grand strategic level provides evidence of the operation of a strategic culture which predisposes Chinese decision-makers towards the pre-emptive, offensive use of force in response to perceived threats to China's national security. Johnston's detailed analysis of the Seven Military Classics and Ming dynasty operational strategy against the Mongol threat on the northern frontier reveals the existence of a strategic culture which accepts that ‘warfare and conflict are relatively constant features of interstate affairs, that conflict with the enemy tends towards zero-sum stakes, and consequently that violence is a highly efficacious means for dealing with conflict’ (Johnston 1995: 61). Johnston labels (ibid.: 61) this view of security as a parabellum (a term derived from the maxim si pacem parabellum – ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’) or realpolitik paradigm ‘whereby the sine qua non of state security is sufficient military capabilities and, preferably, the military defeat of the adversary’. The influence on strategic behaviour of this parabellum paradigm is tempered by an appreciation of the need for a pragmatic response to security threats embodied in the notion of quan bian, or ‘absolute flexibility’ in the application of force – the idea that:
given that constant change is the key characteristic of conflict situations, a strategist must be prepared to adapt to dangers and opportunities as they suddenly appear. The strategist cannot be restricted, constrained by or wedded to self-imposed a priori political, military or moral limits on strategic choices.
(ibid.: 102)