Conclusion

In 1993, Russia had inherited around 205 tactical nuclear and diesel-electric submarines in addition to its 55 strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) from the former Soviet Union (Van der Vat 1995: 347). ¹ By 2003, this number had been reduced to around 35 tactical and 13 strategic submarines (IISS 2003: 90). Since the end of the Cold War therefore, with its 67 boats, the PRC has become the possessor of the world's largest operational tactical submarine fleet. A large number of these boats are old, noisy and obsolete. Even so, with the handful of modern, quiet, well-armed Kilo- and Song-class boats, its submarine fleet is the PLA Navy's most formidable force (Cole 2003a: 135). Taken as a whole, the PLA Navy may be no match for the next largest navy in the western Pacific, that of Japan's self-defence forces, let alone the United States Navy, the Pacific's most powerful naval force. The importance of its submarine arm in its overall force structure marks the PLA Navy as primarily an instrument of strategic defence. But at the tactical and operational level, its undersea warfare capability makes the PLA Navy a force to be reckoned with – even for the US Navy. This is especially true in the narrow seas of the East Asian littoral where China's naval forces could exploit the natural advantages of a coastal navy over the United States’ blue-water fleet.