ABSTRACT
Iran’s thinly veiled bid for nuclear weapons attracts international and American attention, but one proliferation concern – driven by insecurity and the need to garner resources to ensure national survival – may be taking place right under our noses, not in a so-called “rogue state,” but in a key American regional partner in the Persian Gulf – Saudi Arabia. This chapter discusses the sources of Saudi insecurity and the regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that probably are pushing Riyadh toward procuring a nuclear weapons deterrent. Saudi Arabia’s Chinese ballistic missiles acquired in the 1980s would serve as ideal delivery systems for Saudi nuclear weapons. The Saudis most likely would look to China and Pakistan as sources for nuclear warheads for their CSS-2 ballistic missiles or more modern missiles that the Saudis might procure in the future. The Saudis would inevitably work clandestinely to develop a nuclear deterrent – much as they did to procure the CSS-2 missiles – to avoid raising the ire of the United States and to escape preemptive military measures from potential regional rivals.
