ABSTRACT
This chapter examines how the question of the Åland Islands was dealt with by members of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office and other British representatives, such as Thomas Snow, the Minister in Helsinki. The islands were seen as being an issue which could play a part in drawing up alignments at a time when the threat of war was growing across Europe. British policy was to agree to remilitarisation of the Ålands, providing the consent of all the signatories to the 1921 Convention was given, and with the extra proviso that the Soviet Union, a non-signatory, be consulted. The possibility of the islands regaining a military status had emerged in 1938, although no official statement of such intention had been made by the Finnish Government. The Northern Department, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, had maintained a cautious policy towards any changes, being anxious to satisfy Finnish wishes without provoking the Soviet Union. This chapter looks at developments following the formal announcement in early 1939 by the Finnish Government, in partnership with the Government of Sweden, of plans for refortification, when the need for approval from interested parties became imperative. For a while it appeared as if German consent would be withheld, thus damaging Germany’s reputation in Finland and paving the way for what it was hoped in London would be a reconciliation between Finland and the Soviet Union. Interestingly, Germany’s legal right to veto the proposals was brushed under the carpet. In 1938, the legal rights of the Soviet Union had been upheld by the Northern Department, despite being more tenuous than Germany’s. It was further hoped that if Finnish and Soviet differences could be reconciled, then negotiations between Britain and the USSR would be helped. Unfortunately for the British, German consent was eventually given, while the Soviet Union constantly deferred giving a firm decision. Even when the matter reached the League of Nations Council, a decision was not reached, although hope still existed that a compromise between Helsinki and Moscow could be negotiated. During this time, Northern Department officials in general, and Laurence Collier in particular, were clear in their desire to see the Soviet Union included in negotiations. This was not the state of affairs in Munich on 29 September. The Northern Department’s willingness to address the question of Soviet anxieties in the Baltic, with a view to isolating Germany in that region, have largely been ignored in accounts of the last few months of peace in Europe. This chapter reveals the year’s developments regarding the Åland Islands and illustrates how the Northern Department’s goals were frustrated.
