ABSTRACT
The inadequacies of Britain’s defence mechanisms were not as apparent through 1939 as they were shown to be in May 1940, but a study of how the Northern Department reacted to requests for military equipment from Finland at the time show what a poor position Britain’s defence policy was in. Chapter 1 showed the frustrations of Northern Department officials when trying to convince the War Office and Air Ministry to accept Finnish orders for military equipment placed in the UK during 1938. In 1939, with the fear of war increasing, these same problems remained and took on even greater urgency. This chapter examines the manner in which Finnish requirements were handled by the British authorities and the conflict of priorities between the diplomats of the Northern Department, who stressed the necessity of meeting Finnish orders and entertaining senior Finnish personnel, and the officials of the service departments, who had their own concerns about Britain’s immediate military, as opposed to political, needs. The concern of the Northern Department regarding Finland was to attempt to keep the Helsinki government away from engaging in close ties with the government of the Third Reich. They argued that by providing Finland with the material which it requested and by accommodating the wishes of Finnish military personnel to visit Britain, the Finnish Government would feel less inclined to turn towards Germany for help. Their problem was that in attempting to meet this goal through the provision of military assistance to Finland, the suspicions of the Soviet Union were likely to be aroused. It would have been to Moscow’s benefit to have the number of potential enemies reduced, and the weaning away of Finland from German influence was designed to realise this aim. The attempt to achieve a settlement over the Åland Islands which met Finnish aspirations and conciliated Soviet security fears was thus tied in, for the Northern Department, with the efforts to meet Finnish defence requirements. If Moscow trusted Finland, then it would be more likely to understand the British strategy of weaning it away from Germany through rearmament. The Soviet Union figures only indirectly in this chapter, but, as a potential ally against Germany and a potential enemy of Finland, it played a part in Northern Department calculations.
