ABSTRACT
The aim of this chapter is to examine Torbjörn Tännsjö’s claim that we ought to welcome genetic engineering in sports because it will undercut our ‘fascistoid’ admiration of sport stars.1 Tännsjö seems to think that this admiration is fascistoid because it is based on something – ‘strength’ – which is genetically determined and therefore outwith our responsibility. It is here argued that, though the fact that admiration for somebody is based on some property beyond responsibility makes admiration improper, it does not make it fascistoid. Even though they need involve no assumptions about responsibility, the emotions of attraction and repulsion can be fascistoid, if they block out concern for the well-being of people. Further, if genetic engineering were to put strength within the reach of responsibility, it would allow fascistoid tendencies to express themselves in the emotion of admiration, albeit if this engineering is used to level out human differences, there will be less scope for this emotion. It is also argued that the admiration of sport stars is only to a very limited extent admiration of them because of their strength. Finally, an argument is sketched that locates the immorality of fascistoid attitudes in their being fundamentally unjust.
