ABSTRACT
The early months of 1841 saw growing exasperation in London at the continuing lack of progress in establishing Shah Shuja on his throne. Hobhouse sent two dispatches to Auckland in which he criticised the decision to withdraw the Bombay contingent, discounted the current policy as one of trying to maintain stability with an inadequate force, and suggested that it would be better either to withdraw from Afghanistan completely or to accept that troops would have to stay there for several years and in sufficient numbers to ensure its submission.1 Britain would have to make no bones about its responsibility for public order and good government: the present attempts to keep Shah Shuja on a loose rein produced the worst of both worlds – a combination of misgovernment and the conclusion that the British bore responsibility for it. Auckland was somewhat aggrieved2 but, in reply, he and his Council conceded that the situation was unsatisfactory and that time would be needed before Shah Shuja could cease to rely on a British military presence.3 However, they continued to believe that matters would gradually improve and that there was no need to go to either of the extremes set out by Hobhouse. The principal problem was finance: Afghanistan was accounting for £1 million of the Indian Government’s annual deficit of £1.25 million. Eventually, the financial burden might become intolerable, and certainly there was no means of affording extra deployments of troops. Auckland’s temporary solution was to float a 5 per cent financial loan, which attracted over £2 million; enough to sustain current expenditure up to the end of 1842.
