ABSTRACT
Initially, the Soviet response to the coup was one of scepticism and concern. When warned of its imminence, Alexandr Puzanov, the Soviet Ambassador, expressed fears that it might be the work of provocateurs and might lead to the ‘defeat of the progressive forces in the country’.1 According to one source, ‘the [KGB] Residency, the Embassy and the Moscow leadership had little knowledge of the situation in the country, misinterpreted the situation and were hedging against the possibility that the attempted coup would not succeed’. 2 Over three days, the news agency, TASS, explicitly referred to the events of 27 April as a ‘military coup d’état’,3 a clear indication that Moscow did not see it as a ‘popular revolution’, and still less as a revolution that it had itself actively promoted. What happened behind the scenes between the military and the civilians is unclear, but when Taraki met Puzanov, the Soviet Ambassador, on 29 April and assured him that he was in charge and that the regime would ‘belong to the socialist camp’,4 the Soviet Union extended formal recognition and bent its efforts towards ensuring that it would succeed. Puzanov’s view at that stage was that the regime should help strengthen the Soviet position in the country, while conceding that factionalism was a major problem.5 The main focus of the initial Soviet efforts was, therefore, to try to ensure that the regime should be united and broadly based.
