ABSTRACT
If the traditional moral arguments for toleration look so unpromising, perhaps we should try a new tack. Perhaps we can appeal to an ideal that will be shared by both the proponents and opponents of toleration to resolve the dispute. The most obvious candidate for such an ideal is rationality itself, especially since we flatter ourselves that our commitment to toleration is evidence for the superior rationality of the modern world. To think about whether toleration is rational, I argue, we have to consider whether it is rational for the two sides to live in peace with one another. But to live in peace, the two sides must be able to trust each other enough to believe that peace is possible. Toleration thus requires a minimal level of trust, and so whether toleration is rational will depend on whether it is rational for each side to trust the other. Unfortunately, as I will argue in this chapter, that trust is not rationally required. Getting people to tolerate one another will, then, require something more than reason.
