ABSTRACT
Democratic states employ a number of mechanisms in order to control, manage and give guidance to their defence establishments. One of those mechanisms was examined in the previous chapter: having a civilian minister of defence and qualified civilians working within the ministry of defence helping to formulate security policy options for decision-makers and seeing to the implementation of policy. Another is having civilian officials outside the ministry of defence performing similar duties as part of legally constituted bodies of civilian oversight. That is to say, that in having a democratic system of civil-military relations, the presence of civilians in the ministry of defence is only one side of the coin. The other side is having effective institutions of civilian oversight in the parliament, the presidency and the government. With respect to the present chapter, four institutions are of specific interest:
1 parliamentary defence committees, particularly the effectiveness of their budgetary oversight;
2 personnel directorates or commissions on higher military ranks within the administration of the president which advise the head of state on the exercise of his prerogative to award higher military ranks;
3 Security Councils which serve as the main inter-agency body for policy coordination between the security services, other key ministries, and top government officials;
4 Military Inspectorates which check up on the activities of the armed forces.
