ABSTRACT
Solutions to the problem of toleration as stated at the end of chapter 2 are not, it seems, delivered by the sceptical and pluralistic arguments for toleration considered in the last two chapters. In this chapter I consider an influential recent approach to the problem that draws on the idea of reasonableness. To recap, what we seek is an explanation of why a person ought to reject as unjustified the imposition (by herself or her representatives) on others whom she opposes of (at least some of) the commitments which she herself genuinely takes to be justified through responsible belief formation,3 and hence why she ought to defend personal and political principles of toleration prohibiting such impositions. Sceptics and pluralists offer reflections on the nature of the values that inform these commitments. But because these reflections are meta-ethical they fail to deliver a normative requirement fit to drive a justificatory wedge between genuinely taking one’s commitments to be justified, and taking their imposition on others to be justified. On the approach to be considered in this chapter, toleration is justified by the requirement that each person ought to accept that it is unreasonable for her to attempt to impose her responsibly held commitments on another person or group, so long as the disagreement between herself and this person or group which generates their opposition is a reasonable one. On this view, what justifies toleration is the unreasonableness of intolerance.
