ABSTRACT
Introduction On the face of it, the relationship between federalism and decentralization appears to be anachronistic in a double sense. First, the verbal form of the term ‘federal’, i.e. ‘to federate’, means ‘to band together in league for some common object’ (Oxford Concise Dictionary). This suggests that the federating units unite only for the common purpose, and not for specific objectives, for which they retain their distinctive identity. In this sense, decentralization is somewhat built in to the very idea of federation. So long as a federation has been the result of some bottom-up process such as that seen in the USA and Switzerland, traditionally such federations have remained bottom-heavy, with the federating units having their own jurisdiction guaranteed. In the Swiss case, although municipalities (the Communes), the lowest tier in the federation, are governed under the Cantonal constitutions, the 1999 Swiss Constitution added further protection to their identity.1 The constitutional guarantee of the existence of the decentralized local self-governing bodies plus autonomy, is what distinguishes a local selfgoverning body from those that are governed by the laws of the Canton, local or central.2 Second, the literal meaning of the term ‘decentralization’ suggests a process ‘to do away with centralization’, or ‘to distribute powers among local centres’, etc. Both the meanings go against the conventional idea of a federation, which requires some unavoidable extent of centralization (for performing some general functions for the country as a whole purpose). In a typical unitary state, perhaps, decentralization carries more messages than in federations. Federation as a compound polity that combines, as Daniel Elazar reminds us, shared-rule (common purpose) with self-rule (specific regional purpose) entails, as it were, decentralization in respect of self-rule. But nowadays, however, scholars quite comfortably discuss federalism in conjunction with decentralization, for a variety of reasons.3 While we will discuss those reasons, to some extent, shortly in the next section, we need to stress here that in the Asian federations, more particularly in India and Pakistan, decentralization has remained inextricably linked to the very process of federalization itself, because here it is through different forms of
decentralization that the federation has been built, rebuilt, and resized in order to achieve the optimum sizes of federal unit, for the sake of ethno-national homogeneity. Since the Indian and Pakistani federations were once the centralized ‘unitary’ state (under the British colonial rule) out of which the federations have emerged, and since the federal units here have been the result of federationbuilding, doses of decentralization at various levels congruent with the ethnocultural boundaries of the people have informed the process of this federation-building. The other important reason why decentralization has received widespread support is the constitutionally guaranteed very powerful position of the Central Government in these post-colonial federations vis-à-vis the federal units (States or provinces), which has been reinforced practically in the post-Independence period in the name of nation-building and development, and for the sake of security. The three Asian federations under study are but various illustrations in this regard. A distinction is, however, to be made here between India and Malaysia, on the one hand, and Pakistan on the other. In the latter under successive military regimes until 2008, excessive centralization and the near absence of the autonomy of the federal units have characterized the socalled federal system – so much so that many provinces have resorted to insurgency. In the cases of both India and Pakistan, given their complex diversity and the territorial rootedness of the communities with their distinct ethnic identity, localism and regionalism have remained quite powerful forces since the inception of the republic, if not before, demanding autonomy and power – that is to say, forms of decentralization – within the body politic. In the case of India, as we will see shortly below, ethnic-identity-based yet democratic decentralization has helped immensely to territorialize the ethnic conflicts, before they spilled over, at various levels of the polity, as a condition for national unity and integrity. Since the early 1950s, Pakistan, by contrast, has failed to extend recognition to the very strong and self-conscious Bengali ethno-national identity for autonomy, power and decentralization, a failure which has paved the way for the disintegration of the province from the federation in 1971. The federation has yet to be sufficiently sensitive to respond to the ethno-nationalist demands of various self-conscious groups engaged in the struggle for recognition, decentralization, autonomy and power within Pakistan. In the discussion of decentralization, and that too, in the context of federations, the implications of this ethnicity-based yet democratic decentralization do often evade adequate academic attention. The simple population-based and uniform administrative units-based decentralization have received comparatively more attention. And yet, where ethno-regional/ national pressures from below are very strong and demand political recognition and power, as in India and Pakistan, and to some extent in Malaysia, we should not lose sight of the specific ethnic dimensions of decentralization. True, often localism and regionalism, when confronted with the no-solution situation, that is, when faced with state repression and violence rather than the prospects of negotiation, bargaining and compromise, turn secessionist. Conversely, when handled properly, and accommodated within the realm of the possible, the local and the regional seem to serve in the making of the national, and become
indispensable parts of the nation.4 The relationship between federalism and nationalism; the prospects of development of nationhood in conditions of federalism; and so on, are the subject-matter of theoretical debate of a different order.5 The point that is being stressed here is that in complex socio-cultural diversity, a multilayered and faceted nationhood, socio-culturally speaking, seems the reality rather than the imaginary homogeneity much propagated in the discourses on nationalism and nationhood since the eighteenth century. Elsewhere I have analysed in comparative terms the facets of this multilayered nationhood in India and Switzerland in the context of federalism, and have shown how understanding nationhood in India has entailed taking a view of the near and the distant simultaneously (Bhattacharyya 2001a, 2007b). Ronald Watts (Watts 2008) has discussed the various issues of decentralization, such as its measurement and its forms (legislative, financial and administrative), and has made a comparative assessment of decentralization.6 (He used the terms ‘non-centralization’ and ‘decentralization’ interchangeably, however, because of the widespread use of the terms ‘decentralization’.) He is also ready to concede that ‘decentralization and devolution of powers may be desirable to accommodate linguistic, cultural, historical and economic diversity or to enhance administrative efficiency’ (Watts 2008: 178). But the decentralization or noncentralization that Watts like most authors on federalism deals with is state-, or provincial-level decentralization, and not the level(s) below these, such as the districts. These are very important in their own right, because if the states or provinces are not adequately empowered and have the resources, the levels below them cannot function, since, in a federation, for any sub-State (or local)- level decentralization to be meaningful it needs to be linked to and should flow through the state level. Any attempt to decentralize powers and resources directly to local bodies from the central authority will undercut the authority of the State Government, thereby undercutting federalism itself. Such decentralization lacks the federal spirit. For a variety of reasons, some kind of decentralization, as reported in some important recent research (Aziz and Arnold 1996), has been sweeping the Asian countries such as China, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. The decentralizing experiments are varied, conditioned as they are by local political, cultural and economic factors. One of the major thrusts of these experiments, according to Aziz and Arnold, is the widespread consensus on decentralized decision-making on the premise and political imperative that ‘all those whose interests are affected by decisions ought to take part in the decision making process’ (Aziz and Arnold 1996: 14). Local political pressures and factors apart, the process of globalization has also added a stimulus to decentralization (Bhattacharyya 2001a: 129-138). While ever since the late 1950s India has been experimenting, indigenously, with forms of sub-State-level decentralization, a process which has gained added momentum since the early 1990s (more on this soon), Pakistan, which has been under a military dictatorship for much of the time since Independence, remains a late starter, where sub-State-level (its federal character, however, is questionable)
decentralization was launched since 2000 under the overall military rule. Malaysia in this respect is a case apart, where, despite some constitutional provisions for local government, and varieties of local government existing, as we will examine very shortly, democratically formed decentralized local bodies are yet to be established in the federation, which remains highly centralized. Theoretically, it can be argued that decentralization assumes importance in federalism with respect to the following. First, the provisions for decentralization, whether identity-based or not (although identity-based decentralization is more federal in character than one based on population), is to be constitutionally guaranteed, and not to be left to the goodwill of the Central or State governments, or to the power-seeking politicians, Second, the process of devolution of powers and resources is identity-based, as the process is linked to recognition of identity, defined as such in secular terms (e.g. language, region, tribal affiliations, or a combination thereof). Such identity may or may not be territory-based. But the satisfaction of identity in terms of power, autonomy and resources defines the required space of decentralization – a space that is marked by a congruence of culture and politics, cultural boundaries and political boundaries at the levels concerned. Third, decentralization is democratic. It could mean many things. The most important of course is that the decentralized bodies are democratically elected by the local citizens. The decentralized bodies are public-service-driven, that is, they deliver the required public goods to everyone, as well as some targeted groups in the case of specific-purpose-oriented grants without discrimination, since discriminatory service delivery cuts into the very legitimacy of the whole system. Democratic decentralization does not offer any ascribed status to the leaders or the local rulers, since such status is to be achieved democratically at some regular intervals in a process that also replaces the existing rulers. Even the ethnic leaders have to get elected or not by the citizens. Democracy does not recognize and accept any natural leaders as governors. That is, their claim to power is not ascriptive, but achievement-oriented. Finally, decentralization helps democratize the base of the polity by creating pressures from below as a check on concentration and centralization in the system as a whole, which is congenial for federalism.
