Denial of total divine foreknowledge

One way of denying the proposition expressed by (A) would be to deny that the being, x, does believe at t1 the proposition expressed by (B). This would amount to denial of total divine foreknowledge, but would allow for the preservation of the infallibility of divine belief. The proposition about Paul is only an example, so one would have to claim that no infallible being had any beliefs at any given time about any future free action, i.e. any free action after that time, whether the action be done by a human or by a divine being. This is what Richard Swinburne does in The Coherence of Theism and The Christian God:

But it seems to me more satisfactory to [. . . ] define God’s omniscience accordingly, not as knowledge at each period of time, of all true propositions, but as knowledge of all propositions that it is logically possible that he entertain then and that, if entertained by God then, are true, and that it is logically possible for God to know then without the possibility of error.