ABSTRACT
Bilateral political and economic relations with China improved vastly from late 1992 onwards. However, in the wider Asian arena where Russia and China must interact with other states, and in particular, with the United States and Japan the viability of the relationship was less clear. The improvement in relations aimed at ‘strategic cooperation in the twenty-first century’ had implications for both Asia and the world as a whole. With the collapse of the Soviet empire, the new Central Asian states, in particular those with large energy resources, were courted by states not always to Russia’s liking and this was seen as a threat to Russian interests in the ‘near abroad’. As China’s economic clout increased, and it sought to play a more active part in transnational energy projects, Moscow became fearful that its economic and strategic interests could clash with those of Beijing. In the Asia-Pacific, Russia was not yet a major player and relied largely on China for an ‘introduction’ to many of the regions’ important fora. As the political relationship progressed, statements by the two countries on international questions took on a broader aspect, including a pledge to take ‘joint action’ in the United Nations Security Council and a common opposition to the perceived hegemony of the United States in world affairs. For this reason some saw the relationship as having a purely negative basis which, once one or the other state had resolved its conflicts with the United States (and to a certain extent Japan) would cease to have a raison d’être. However, in interviews with Russian academics and government officials, it was emphasised that relations with China had an absolute value, irrespective of the state of relations with either the United States or Japan. The relationship was thus characterised as a strategic goal of Russian foreign policy, that is, just as good or important as the relationship with Japan.2 El’tsin indeed was at pains to deny any hint of an ‘alliance’ between Russia and China, stating ‘it is a transition to deep friendly relations, but in no way an alliance of two states directed against any third state
or states’.3 Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Kunadze made the point even more forcefully:
It would be wrong to interpret the president’s visit to China that way [i.e. as a result of difficulties with Japan]. To view any of our steps – much less top-level visits to Asian countries – as an attempt somehow to offset the postponed visit to Japan would be at the very least to oversimplify our approach to the APR.4
