ABSTRACT
In their discussion of regulatory space, Hancher and Moran note that ‘the purpose and character of economic regulation is in part a function of the nature of the surrounding legal culture’ (1998: 149). As mentioned in my introduction, the Chinese legal system that evolved out of socialism was designed to protect the interests of the state, with the result that no independent system of administering and enforcing the law was established. However, the social contract of reciprocity at all levels that has evolved provides a clue. Despite what we might term a historical background of ‘command and control’ sanctions (otherwise termed ‘rule by law’ and associated with an authoritarian mode of governance), self-regulation has become the dominant mode of activity.5 This points to a combination of cultural factors and legal factors determining the efficacy of regulation in the People’s Republic of China. The key issue is that civil processes such as the rule of law and contract are only loosely administered in China. If we are to talk about interest articulation in China, we find that it occurs at different levels of government and at different stages of the policy process.6 As in most countries, policy is invariably influenced by powerful forces: in China not so much in a direct manner by private interests, but by institutionalised factions within China’s bureaucracy, often with links to private interests. Producers are therefore ‘takers’ of regulation. However, many producers will, out of political expediency, make their own arrangements with officials, bureaucrats and censors in the different levels of broadcasting bureaus. The regulatory authority owned by such people is similar in many ways to Bourdieu’s notion of social capital (1984), only that in China this authority is earned through bureaucratic rank (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 142-3).
