ABSTRACT

A key notion in the theoretical framework presented in this book is that workers had a postulated interest in wrestling greater control of the surplus product from the party-state. It is not clear what form a democratic alternative of worker control would take; it could include such possibilities as worker ownership of enterprises or continued state ownership, with indirect control over the enterprises exercised through free and democratic elections of the national governments. Since workers have an interest in ending their exploitation, under certain circumstances, they can be mobilized against the system. Thus, the analysis of postulated interests indicates the potential for various groups to revolt against a system, but their actual revolt is not predetermined. Throughout this book the conditions for worker participation in revolts have been analyzed. It was shown that worker participation was essential for the Czechoslovak and East German revolutions, which adds credence to the fruitfulness of using the concept of postulated interests as an analytical tool. Critics, though, will be certainly quick to point out the problem that in all four countries, the first post-communist governments carried out rightwing, pro-market policies. Why did workers not follow their postulated interests and demand control over the surplus product? Why were they willing to accept a new economic system in which a different class would replace the party-state and take control over the surplus product, and therefore, become a new group with power over the workers?