ABSTRACT
The Polish and Hungarian crises, following on Khrushchev’s violent denunciation of Stalin and advocacy of reform, undermined the Soviet leader’s position within the Kremlin. He had never been strong enough to oust the Stalinists in the Praesidium (Politburo), among them Molotov and Malenkov, who now attacked him on the easiest of targets – the economy, which under centralist control never lived up to expectations. The struggle took the form of disputing which were the right reforms to follow: reforms which sought to make the government ministries more efficient, a policy backed by Malenkov and Molotov, or reforms based on reconstituted party control over the economy regionally organised, as advocated by Khrushchev. The conflict came to a head in June 1957 when the Praesidium, by a majority of seven to four, voted against Khrushchev. That should have been the end. But Khrushchev turned the tables by appealing to the larger party body, the Central Committee, which he claimed alone could deprive him of the post of first secretary. With Marshal Zhukov’s help, military aircraft flew the party representatives to Moscow from the outlying provinces. Khrushchev won the support he needed and dubbed his opponents on the Praesidium the ‘anti-party’ group. All these opponents now lost real power for good, but there was to be no return to Stalinist vengeance. They were sent far away; it was with a touch of humour that Khrushchev decided to send the dour Molotov as ambassador to Mongolia and Malenkov to man-
age a power station in Kazakhstan; only Bulganin was allowed to remain at the centre, acting as titular premier until 1958.
