ABSTRACT
Upon admission to the UN in 1956, the Japanese government advocated ebulliently a ‘UN-centred diplomacy’. Kishi Nobusuke reiterated this in February 1957 (when he was still foreign minister), stating that Japan’s policy would revolve around the three pillars of: cooperation with other democracies; maintaining a position as a member of Asia; and UN-centrism. However, beyond the rhetoric the Japanese government was unable, and unwilling, to push forward with such a proactive policy in a Cold War world divided structurally by East-West ideological conflict. Instead, it located itself firmly in the Western, capitalist camp, displaying overriding preferences for economism and minimum security commitments that accompanied bilateral cooperation with the US. These were articulated in the Yoshida Doctrine. Thus, for the first few decades of Japan’s UN membership, the concept of UN-centred diplomacy was a hollow one compromised by the structural constraints imposed by the international order which limited policy to meeting budget contributions to the UN, joining various organs of the UN system, as was seen in Chapter 18, serving occasionally as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, and maintaining bilateralism by voting until the early 1970s in line with the US on issues such as support for Taiwan as the Chinese representative in the UN.
