ABSTRACT
David Papineau introduces his book, Philosophical Naturalism, with the observation
that though the term “philosophical naturalism” (“naturalism”, for short) is a familiar
one nowadays, there is no universal consensus about its meaning.1 Papineau believes that naturalism is a commitment to the completeness of physics, where physics is
complete in the sense that a purely physical specification of the world, plus physical
laws, will always suffice to explain what happens. The concepts of physics, however,
change over time. What categories, therefore, will qualify as ‘physical’ in the ultimate or final physics? We cannot, says Papineau, presently answer this question with any
certitude. At best, we can specify one category which will not qualify, and that is the
category of the psychological which involves propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs,
desires) that represent things as being a certain way (intentionality).2
