ABSTRACT
Few topics in the philosophy of psychiatry, or perhaps of medicine generally, have generated so many words, essays, papers and even books. Yet it is fair to say that the product has been more heat than light, more confusion than clarity. On the one hand Szasz claims that ‘mental illness’ is a metaphorical phrase and that all illnesses are physiological malfunctions or not illnesses at all (Szasz 1987:ch. 5). On the other side of the divide Sedgwick claims all illnesses are socially defined, suggesting that ‘there are no illnesses or diseases in nature’ (Sedgwick 1982:30). Others have looked to definitions based upon psychological or cognitive malfunctions as the key criteria of ‘mental illness’. Some have fought a reductionist battle making cognitive malfunctions equivalent to physiological brain malfunctions, based upon a materialist monist philosophy of mind. Yet others have sought to draw up lists of criteria or defining qualities of illness. No work or body of ideas has been definitive or set any form of intellectual benchmark within this debate, save perhaps for Szasz, who has provided less of a solution and more of a target to criticise.
