ABSTRACT
The central problem for moral philosophy is the question of judgement, which, of course, involves the problem of the norms and the criteria used for its justification. The hermeneutic-inspired philosophy has always argued that these norms must be judged on the basis of the values that a community shares. For the hermeneutic tradition, which, as we have already mentioned, has influenced our postmodern distrust of universalist theories, there is no vantage point outside a shared world of meanings, as outside such a world there is no possibility of communication. We are always already within language, and therefore we are always full of prejudices, that is, of pre-judgements, values and ideas that are part of our capacity for judging rather than hindrances to it. The fact that we belong to a world of shared values is what makes us capable of delivering judgements. Indeed, because we belong to a group or a community, we also share its idea of the good, and can therefore decide on the evilness of, say, an action by a group or an individual, or the appropriateness of a law for the community. Without this rich world of values which shapes and forms our judgements, we would be incapable of moral choices.
