ABSTRACT
The concept of ‘fascist ideology’ has become the focus of a heated controversy among researchers of fascism. The debates about the nature of fascism ever since the 1960s have undoubtedly contributed to the elaboration of the most fundamental questions of definition; yet, after more than half a century, the quest for interpretive consensus appears perhaps more elusive than ever.1 Attempts to devise a generic ideological minimum of fascism have stumbled upon two major objections. On the one hand, a number of historians have categorically rejected the notion that a specific fascist value system underpinned the decisions and actions of the fascist movements/regimes. On the other hand, even amongst those who accept the ontological value of fascist ideas, there is widespread scepticism about the validity and utility of a generic model of ‘fascist ideology’. The comparative grand theories of R. Griffin (palingenetic ideology of a ‘third way’), S. Payne (new form of right-wing authoritarianism), R. Eatwell (new radical right) and G.L. Mosse (third way) – to mention only a few generic interpretations2 – have been criticised for their inflexibility and alleged failure to account for the fundamental differences in the ideas and practices of the wide sample of ‘fascist’ movements/regimes in recent history. Contrary to the emphatic suggestion of the ‘genericists’ that indigenous fascism can be best understood horizontally (in comparison to similar ideological/political phenomena of other countries), critics underscore the significance of dealing with ‘fascist’ cases within the framework of distinctive national traditions and long-term developments.
